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Troubled Waters: A Reaction to the
Eleventh Circuit's Pollution of
CERCLA's Safe Harbor for Lenders
INTRODUCTION

Congress, responding to the increasing dangers presented by
improper hazardous waste disposal, passed the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
("CERCLA" or "the Act") in 1980.1 This Act, the ultimate
coalescence of three bills formerly considered in either the House
of Representatives or the Senate 2 emerged from eleventh-hour
compromises in the last days of the final session of the Ninetysixth Congress. 3
In pursuit of the Act's salutary goals, and in deference to
Congress' intended liberal interpretation, 4 courts have construed
and applied CERCLA generously 5 Logically, this analytic breadth
has developed in a CERCLA area that readily lends itself to
judicial scrutiny-private party liability 6

1 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-57 (1982), amended by Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613-1782 (1986) (codified
throughout 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
2 See Grad, A Legislative History of the ComprehensiveEnvironmentalResponse,
Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 CoLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 1
(1982); see also United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F Supp. 573, 578 (D.
Md. 1986) (arguing that four bills merged to form CERCLA).
Grad, supra note 2, at 1.
4 See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313,
1317
(11th Cir. 1990).
5 See Smith, The Expansive Scope of Liable PartiesUnder CERCLA, 63 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 821, 824 (1989).
6 See United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726,
744 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987) (holding that corporate officers
can be held liable under CERCLA without "piercing the corporate veil"); New York v.
Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985), aff'd, 763 F.2d 49 (1985)
(construing CERCLA to impose strict liability with limited causation defenses); Maryland
Bank & Trust, 632 F Supp. at 579 (holding secured creditor exemption inapplicable to
foreclosing mortgagee); United States v. South Carolina Recycling and Disposal, Inc., 21
Env't Dep. Cas. 1577, 1581 (D.S.C. 1984) (holding lessee liable as "owner" of contaminated facility).

[VOL. 79

KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL

Until recently, the almost uniform judicial attitude of CERCLA expansiveness was justifiable. Through fair statutory reading
and reasonable derivation of Congressional intent, courts had
vigorously, but sensibly, pursued the remedial purposes contemplated by the Act. 7 Unfortunately, the Eleventh Circuit now has
deviated from responsible statutory application. In United States
v. Fleet Factors Corp.," the Eleventh Circuit became the first to
evaluate CERCLA's liability exemption for lenders.9 When finished with its exposition, the Eleventh Circuit effectively had
transformed CERCLA's lender exemption from its intended use
as a safe harbor into a dangerous morass which, like the hazardous waste dumps prompting the Act, now needs redress. In evaluating this lender exemption, the Fleet Factorscourt, so entranced
by CERCLA's "remedial" purpose, 10 unjustifiably disregarded
the Act's clear import regarding secured creditors and rendered a
decision far outside the bounds of interpretive credibility
Imtially, this Note gives a brief overview of the relationship
between CERCLA liability and lenders." Next, it assesses the
predominant district court analysis of this relationship-an anal2
ysis rejected in Fleet Factors.1
The Eleventh Circuit's decision
3
then is discussed.' Finally, Fleet Factors is critically examined to
show the fault in a decision, based on an unsupportable interpretation of the Act, that will virtually guarantee substantial liability
for lenders in situations plainly unintended by CERCLA's liability
4
scheme.1
I.

CERCLA

LIABILITY AND SECURED CREDITORS

While Congress allocated a significant amount of federal monies to fund the operational aspects of CERCLA, 15 it intended the

7

See infra notes 42-63 and accompanying text.

8 901 F.2d 1550 (lith Cir. 1990), cert. denied,

-

U.S.

-,

III S. Ct. 752

(1991).
, United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1556 (lth Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, U.S.
-,
111 S. Ct. 752 (1991).
1oId. at 1557.
" See infra notes 15-41 and accompanying text.
n See infra notes 42-63 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 64-87 and accompanying text.
'4 See infra notes 88-111 and accompanying text.

is See 26 U.S.C. § 9507 (1988) (establishing "Hazardous Substance Superfund" to
replace "Hazardous Substance Response Fund"); 42 U.S.C. § 9631 (repealed 1986)

(establishing "Hazardous Substance Response Fund").
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"Superfund"' 6 only to guarantee an environmentally curative response. That is, CERCLA countenances the use of governmental
17
dollars, when necessary, to correct a hazardous waste danger;
subsequently, CERCLA's private liability provisions authorize suit
for compensation from designated "responsible parties."' 8
Private party liability for removal and/or remedial action
under CERCLA requires the establishment of four basic factors:1 9
1) the existence of a "facility"; 20 2) the occurrence of a "release" 2'
or "threatened release" 22 of a "hazardous substance";21 3) the
incurrance of costs associated with response to the release or
threatened release; u and, 4) the presence of a liable party under
the terms of the Act. 25 This Note focuses primarily on the fourth
necessary element.
CERCLA's "covered persons ' 26 include individuals that fit
the following categories:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel
or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous
substance owned or operated any facility at which
hazard27
ous substances were disposed of.

1626 U.S.C. § 9507.
17 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1982 & Supp. Iv 1986).
Is 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (listing parties potentially liable under
the Act).
19See, e.g., United States v. New Castle County, 727 F Supp. 854, 859 (D. Del.
1989); Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F Supp. 573, 576 (D. Md. 1986).
- 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (.'[F]acility' means
(B) any site
or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed,
or otherwise come to be located.
").
2242 U.S.C. § 9601(22) ("[R]elease" includes, subject to certain exceptions, "any
spilling, leaking, pumping, pounng, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping,
leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment (including the abandonment or
discarding of barrels, containers, and other closed receptacles contaimng any hazardous
substance or pollutant or contaminant).
").
2 Id. CERCLA does not specifically provide the meaning of "threatened."
See
United States v. Northernaire Plating Co., 670 F Supp. 742, 747 (W.D. Mich. 1987),
aff'd, 889 F.2d 1497 (1987) (discussing a threatened release).
" 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (providing multiple cross-references to other environmental
statutes for definition of "hazardous substance").
2 Though CERCLA does not define "response costs," the Act does define "respond" and "response." See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25) ("'[R]espond' or 'response' means
remove, removal, remedy, and remedial action[;] all such terms (including the terms
'removal' and 'remedial action') include enforcement activities related thereto.").
2 See infra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
42 U.S.C. § 9607.
27 Id.
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The Act sanctions parties covered by these provisions with joint

and several, 28 strict liability, 29 subject only to the limited affir30
mative defenses afforded by the Act.
Crucial to the scope of the aforementioned provisions, and
central to this discussion, is the meaning of "owner and operator ,,3, Typical of the drafting which has elicited criticism from
courts and commentators, 32 CERCLA's definitional section denotes, in relevant part,
The term "owner or operator ' 33 means
(ii) in the case of
an onshore facility or an offshore facility, any person owmng
or operating such facility
Such term does not include a
person, who, without participating in the management of a
vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect
34
his security interest in the vessel or facility

This provision's obvious circularity has not been lost on the courts
in their struggle to apply its difficult language.3 5 Actually, the
section's exempting language seems to offer more guidance as to

the meaning of the term "owner or operator" than does the
definitional language itself. 36 Although complicated by structural
2 See Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. UI Int'l Corp., 702 F Supp. 1384, 1389 (N.D. Ill.
1988); 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (providing means for seeking contribution for persons adjudged liable under § 9607).
29 See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985);
42 U.S.C.-§ 9601(32) (referring to Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. § 1321), which has been
held to impose strict liability, as defimng CERCLA liability standard).
30 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (providing defenses when release or threatened release is
caused solely by "(1) an act of God; (2) an act of war; (3) an act or omission of a third
party," assuming that no contractual relationship exists between the defendant and third
party, the defendant exercised due care, and the defendant guarded against foreseeable
results from the third party's acts or omissions); Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1042.
11Although 42 U.S.C. § 9607 includes conjunctive "owner and operator" language,
courts have determined the correct construction to be the disjunctive "owner or operator"
found in 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A). See United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d
1550, 1554 n.3 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, U.S.
-,
III S. Ct. 752 (1991).
32 See Artesian Water Co. v. Government of New Castle County, 851 F.2d 643,
648 (3rd Cir. 1988) ("CERCLA is not a paradigm of clarity or precision
Problems
of interpretation have arisen from the Act's use of inadequately defined terms.
.);
Grad, supra note 2, at 2 ("[A] hastily assembled bill and a fragmented legislative history
add to the usual difficulty of discerning the full meaning of the law.").
33 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
- 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A).
32 See Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 861 F.2d 155, 156 (7th
Cir. 1988) ("This [language] is circular, although it does imply that if Mena is neither
'onshore' or 'offshore'-perhaps because in outerspace?-then an owner or operator is
not a statutory 'owner or operator' ").
36 See infra notes 98-111 and accompanying text.
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shortcomings, one truth must remain as the interpretive underpinning of the "owner or operator" definition: Congress intended
to exempt qualifying lenders from the potential liability that at7
taches when labelled an "owner or operator" under CERCLA.1
The question thus begged is the exemption's scope. To be
insulated from liability, a secured creditor must fulfill the conditions set forth in the exemption. A lender's ownership interest
must be held "primarily to protect his security interest in the
vessel or facility.''38 This condition seems the very definition of
a secured creditor, envisioning ownership status of the subject
party in a narrowly defined capacity 19 Further, a lender must
abstain from participation in the "management of a ... facility.""4 Though perhaps a bit more open-ended than the former
condition, this qualification undoubtedly addresses operational,
as opposed to ownership participation by the party seeking exemption.
The Act's lender exemption logically insulates lenders from
liability in the two areas around which CERCLA liability revolves-owner liability and operator liability Unfortunately, the
Eleventh Circuit's failure to note this duality, in United States v
Fleet FactorsCorp.,41 resulted in an exemption structure for lenders far different from the ones formulated by the various district
courts that have faced the question, and far different from the
one intended by Congress in enacting CERCLA.
II.

UNITED STATES V. MIRABILE AND ITS PROGENY: DISTRICT
COURT EXEMPTION INTERPRETATION

In United States v Mirabile,42 the initial district court to
interpret CERCLA's secured creditor exemption 43 yielded a decision roundly endorsed by other district courts subsequently facing
the exemption issue." In Mirabile, the United States sought CERCLA compensation from the current owners of property upon

"

42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A).

:8 Id.
" See U.C.C. § 9-105 (1972) ('Secured party' means a lender, seller or other
person to whom accounts, contract rights or other chattel paper have been sold.").
- 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A).
41 901 F.2d at 1550.
42 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20994 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
43 United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20994, 20995 (E.D.
Pa. 1985).
" See infra note 61.
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which a release of hazardous substances had occurred. The exemption analysis arose because of the defendants' third party
complaints against various lenders. The defendants alleged that
the lenders' activities in relation to the owner of the site at the
time of contamination would establish liability against the lenders
45
for "creation of the hazardous conditions" at the site.
As previously noted, 46 and as shown in Mirabile,47 the scope
of the exemption language comprises the critical inquiry when
applying the secured creditor exemption. In Mirabile, it apparently was obvious that the lenders involved satisfied the ownership
prong of the exemption by possessing ownership attributes primarily to protect a security interest. 41 Operational values presented
the contended point. The court framed the issue clearly- "[T]he
exemption plainly suggests that provided a secured creditor does
not become overly entangled in the affairs of the actual owner or
operator of a facility, the creditor may not be held liable for
cleanup costs. " 49
The Mirabile court based its interpretation on CERCLA's
perceived normative justification: "[I]n enacting CERCLA Congress manifested its intent to impose liability upon those who
were responsible for and profited from improper disposal practices." ' 50 Since CERCLA targeted the party or parties actually
responsible for the creation of a hazardous waste danger, the
court reasoned that only actual control by a person could result
in liability under the Act. 5' Thus, "it would appear that before a
secured creditor
may be held liable, it must, at a minimum,
operational aspects of the site.' '52
day-to-day
the
participate in
To the court, the distinction between such functional involvement in management and financial participation was "critical." 53
Indeed, the court, by comparison, indicated the equitable difference between financial and operational involvement. Operational
participation-in which a person actually partakes in the "nutsand-bolts" 54 conduct of a facility-justifies the imposition of

4S

46

Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20995.
See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.

47

Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20994.

48

Id. at 20995.

49

Id.

SOId. at 20996.

Id.
,2Id. (emphasis added).
11 Id. at 20995.
u Id.
51
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liability on the theory that such a participant is realistically responsible for the dangerous condition created. Financial participation-in which a person has no involvement in a site's "nutsand-bolts" management-does not justify the imposition of liability, resting on a more attenuated, putative standard of site
control .55
The court buttressed its standard of operational rather than
financial involvement with a specific textual example from the
exemption. The exemption's language offers protection to a secured creditor not participating in the management of a "facility "56 The Mirabile court convincingly seized on CERCLA's
categorical language:
The reference to management of the "facility," as opposed to
management of the affairs of the actual owner or operator of
the facility, suggests once again that the participation which is
critical is participation in operational, production, or waste
disposal activities. Mere financial ability to control waste disposal practices of the sort possessed by the secured creditors in
this case is not, in my view, sufficient for the imposition of
liability 7
In reaching its decision on the scope of CERCLA's secured
creditor exemption, the court heard numerous policy arguments
relating to the effects of its interpretation. The court expressly
acknowledged the strong governmental interest in recovering response costs. 58 While recognizing this interest, an interest which
surely pervades CERCLA,5 9 the court properly restricted its role
to applying, rather than expanding, the Act:
Obviously, imposition of liability on secured creditors or lending
institutions would enhance the government's chances of recovering its cleanup costs.
It may well be that the imposition
of such liability would help to ensure more responsible management of such sites. The consideration of such policy matters,
and the decision as to the imposition of such liability, however,
lies with Congress. In enacting CERCLA Congress singled out
secured creditors for protection from liability under certain circumstances.60
55Id.
56 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
17

Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20995.

,1Id. at 20996.
19See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
60Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (EnvtI. L. Inst.) at 20996.
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In casting initial judicial light on CERCLA's secured creditor
exemption, the court adhered to the statutory language and the
intent manifested by Congress, rather than pursuing with unbridled vigor any suspect party Subsequent courts have followed its
interpretive lead without substantial alteration. 61 Indeed, the dis-62
trict court decision in United States v Fleet Factors Corp.
embodied and perhaps even extended Mirabile's spirit, holding
the exemption "to permit secured creditors to provide financial
assistance and general, and even isolated instances of specific,
management advice to its debtors without risking CERCLA lia-

bility
III.

"63

THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT'S EXEMPTION INTERPRETATION

In United States v Fleet Factors Corp. 4 the Eleventh Circuit,
reviewing the district court's summary judgment decision, became
the first court of appeals to address the scope of CERCLA's
secured creditor exemption. 65 Fleet Factors, the defendant targeted
for CERCLA liability, entered into a factoring agreement with a
textile company that operated at the "facility" in issue. Under
this agreement, Fleet Factors advanced funds to the textile company in exchange for the company's accounts receivable. This
advance, secured by a deed of trust from the company to Fleet
Factors, gave Fleet Factors a security interest in both the facility
itself and in various equipment, assets, and inventories."
The textile business ultimately failed, bankrupting the debtor.
Fleet Factors, its advanced funds not fully reimbursed by the
collection of assigned accounts receivable, foreclosed on some of
the inventory and assets on which it held the deed of trust.
Subsequently, the Environmental Protection Agency discovered

61 See Guidice v. BFG Electroplating and Mfg. Co., 732 F Supp. 556, 562-63 (W.D.
Pa. 1989); United States v. Nicolet, 712 F Supp. 1193, 1204-05 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Rockwell
Int'l Corp. v. Int'l Corp., 702 F Supp. 1384, 1390 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Coastal Casting
Serv., Inc. v. Aron, No. H-86-4463 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 18, 1988) (WESTLAW, Allfeds
library).
62724 F Supp. 955 (S.D. Ga. 1988), aff'd on other grounds, 901 F.2d 1550 (11th
-,
Ill S. Ct. 752 (1991).
U.S.
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 63 United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 724 F Supp. 955, 960 (S.D. Ga. 1988),
U.S.
,
aff'd on other grounds, 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991).
U.S.
, 111 S. Ct. 752
6 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, (1991).
61Id. at 1556.
Id. at 1552.
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the presence of improperly stored toxic chemicals, as well as large
amounts of asbestos, at the facility The EPA spent about $400,000
responding to the threat; it then sought recovery of costs from
various parties, including Fleet Factors. 67
The court's secured creditor exemption interpretation arose
from Fleet Factors's involvement with the facility 68 As in United
States v. Mirabile,69 the exemption did not focus on the "indicia
of ownership." Rather, Fleet Factors's attempt to invoke the
secured creditor exemption turned on the provision's second qualification: "The critical issue is whether Fleet participated in man' 70
agement sufficiently to incur liability under the statute.
The court began with the predictable, incanting CERCLA's
"essential policy" of penalizing "'those responsible for problems
caused by the disposal of chemical poison."' 7' 1 Not surprisingly,
the adversaries offered polarized exemption interpretations. The
government argued for loss of exemption when a lender participates "in any manner in the management of a facility "72 Fleet
Factors responded with the standard announced in United States
v Mirabile,73 and followed by the trial court, which drew the
protective line at "day-to-day operational management of a facility

"74

Considering the standard ultimately adopted, the court exhibited iromc solicitousness for lenders in rejecting the government's
virtual per se approach. The court remarked that such a rule
"would largely eviscerate the exemption Congress intended to
afford secured creditors

. . [and] could expose all such lenders

to CERCLA liability for engaging in their normal course of
business." 75
The court also refused to follow the Mirabile standard. 76 The
court prefaced this departure with a firm announcement of its
self-imposed task: "In order to achieve the 'overwhelmingly re67

Id. at 1552-53.

" Id. at 1555-56.
15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20992 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
70 Fleet Factors,901 F.2d at 1556.
7" Id. at 1553 (quoting Flonda Power & Light v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d
1313, 1316 (11th Cir. 1990)).
Id. at 1556.
71 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20994 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
74 Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1556; see also supra notes 42-63 and accompanying

text.
73

Fleet Factors,901 F.2d at 1556.

76 Id.

at 1557.
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medial' goal of the CERCLA statutory scheme, ambiguous statutory terms should be construed to favor liability for the costs
incurred by the government in responding to the hazards at such
' 77
facilities.
Although implying ambiguity in CERCLA's secured creditor
exemption, 7 the court purported to reject the Mirabile standard,
claiming it "ignores the plain language of the exemption and
essentially renders it meaningless. ' 79 To the Eleventh Circuit, a
rule requiring operational participation by the lender in order to
forfeit exemption protection would amount to a judicially constructed redundancyIndividuals and entities involved in the operations of a facility
are already liable as operators.
Had Congress intended to
absolve secured creditors from ownership liability, it would have
done so. Instead, the statutory language chosen by Congress
explicitly holds secured creditors liable if they participate in the
management of a facility 80
Based on this theory, lenders who fulfill the Mirabile operational standard already have achieved "operator" status, with
attendant liability attaching. The court then created a lesser rule
for judging the level of management participation necessary to
destroy the statutory exemption:
Under the standard we adopt today, a secured creditor may
incur
liability, without being an operator, by participating
in the financial management of a facility to a degree indicating
a capacity to influence the corporation's treatment of hazardous
wastes.
[Stated another way,] a secured creditor will be
liable if its involvement
is sufficiently broad to support the
inference that it could affect hazardous waste disposal decisions
if it so chose.8 '
The court supported its "narrow construction ' 82 of CER'8 3
CLA's lender exemption by referring to the Act's "sparse

7

Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (quoting Florida Power & Light, 893

F.2d at 1317).
75

Id.

79 Id.

10 Id.
'

'3

(emphasis added).
Id. at 1557-58 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 1558 n.ii.
Id.
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pertinent legislative history The history quoted in the case suggested the reasoning behind the exemption:
This change [the insertion of the exemption] is necessary because
the original definition inadvertently subjected those who hold
facility, but do not participate in the management
title to a
or operation and are not otherwise affiliated with the person
facility, to the liability provisions
leasing or operating the
of the bill.84
The Fleet Factors court reasoned that the word "affiliated" necessitated a standard of liability based on "a more peripheral
degree of involvement with the affairs of a facility than that
necessary to be held liable as an operator." 5
After announcing its putative control standard, based solely
on financial involvement, the court tersely addressed the possible
adverse effects such a decision might have on lenders. In summarily justifying any negative effects, the court argued that a low
exemption standard would give "strong incentive '8 6 for close
oversight and thus foster compliance with proper disposal practices. Further, in the court's estimation, lenders could treat added
risk of liability as a cost of doing business, by "weigh[ing] [such
risks] into the terms of the loan agreement," ' in pursuit of their
newly imposed role as toxic police.

IV. A

CRITIQUE OF THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT'S

ANALYSIS

The beneficial purposes underlying CERCLA are clear Improper disposal and storage of hazardous wastes presents risks
that imperil all of society by threatening the quality of water,
soil, and air.8" Likewise, CERCLA's normative aim of pinmng
liability on those responsible for the creation of a hazardous waste
threat is admirable. 9 These truths resist contention. Yet, the
pursuit of these goals must lie within the legislative judgment of
Congress, embodied within the statute. In United States v Fleet

ON E vmoNm:NTAL AND PuBuc WoRKs, 97th
" Id. (quoting 2 SENATE COMMa.
Cong., 2d Sess., 2 A Legislative History of the CERCLA 945 (Comm. Prnt 1983)
(remarks of Rep. Harsha)).
Id. at 1558 n.l1.
" Id.
at 1559.
" Id. at 1558.
" See Grad, supra note 2, at 7.
8942 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (listing parties potentially liable under
the Act).
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Factors Corp.,90 the Eleventh Circuit facially ignored Congress's
judgment regarding lender CERCLA liability and fashioned a
standard completely incompatible with the language and import
of the Act.
In seeking to define the critical "participation in management" standard of the CERCLA exemption, the court characterized the Act as ambiguous. 91 Any ambiguity results exclusively
from the court's reading of the Act. CERCLA imposes liability
on two nonexclusive classes of parties-owners and operators. 92
For these purposes, a person must be either an owner or an
operator of a facility to be liable. With equal clarity, CERCLA's
secured creditor exemption precludes the label of owner or oper93
ator from attaching to lenders who comply with its conditions.
The Eleventh Circuit's evaluation of this scheme missed, or ignored, the critical observation that the exemption encompasses
both owners and operators. Recall the exemption's language:
"Such term [owner or operator] does not include a person, who,
without participating in the management of a .
facility, holds
indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in
the . facility '"94
Seemingly oblivious to this explicit language, the court baldly
asserted,
The government correctly formulates tlns issue [Fleet's liability]
as being comprised of two distinct, but related, means of finding
Fleet liable.
First, Fleet is liable
if it operated the
facility
Alternatively, Fleet can be held liable if it had an
indicia of ownership
and managed the facility to the extent
necessary to remove it from the secured creditor liability exemption. 95
The court clearly saw the exemption as applying only to potential
"owner" liability; 96 this reading is plainly erroneous. Instead of
validly decrying a redundancy imposed by the court in United

901 F.2d 1550 (lth Cir. 1990), cert. denied,

-

U.S.

,

II S. Ct. 752

(1991).
91See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
92See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
93 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1987 & Supp. IV 1986) (emphasis added).
91United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1556 n.6 (llth Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, - U.S. , III S. Ct. 752 (1991).
96 See id., see also supra note 80 and accompanying text (explicit rejection of
exemption application to operator status).
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States v Mirabile,97 the Eleventh Circuit's refusal to read the
exemption as pertaining to the definition of both "owners" and
"operators" amounts to the creation of a redundancy that would
not exist in an accurate reading of CERCLA.
The court's fallacious conclusion that the exemption applied
only to "owner" status necessitated tortured analysis. For example, "[a]lthough similar, the phrase 'participation in the management' and the term 'operator' are not congruent." 98 To the
contrary, the conditions placed within the secured creditor exemption-ownership indicia held primarily for the purpose of
protecting a security interest and non-participation in facility management-apparently provide the definitional substance of
"owner" and "operator," which is so lacking in the statute's
circular description.99 Hence, to own a facility is to hold ownership indicia for purposes other than security interest protection.
Likewise, to operate a facility is to participate in its management.
Such reasoning finds support in the very legislative history
inappropriately relied on by the court. 100 The court read the
reference of "those who hold title to a
. facility but do not
participate in the management or operation and are not otherwise
affiliated with the
facility" 10
' as supporting an exemption
standard lower than that in the statutory definition of "owner or
operator" status. 0 2 Instead, the other affiliation referred to should
be read as addressing instances referred to in the statute in which
"ownership indicia" is not held primarily for the protection of a
security interest. 03 In this way, lenders would forfeit exempt
status by being statutory "owners or operators" instead of mere
secured creditors.
The harm in the Eleventh Circuit's fallacious statutory construction is shown in the fantastic legal relationships created by
" 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20994, 20995-96 (E.D. Pa. 1985). For a
discussion finding an inherent circularity and redundancy in the CERCLA's definition of
"owner and operator," see supra notes 31-41.

" Fleet Factors,901 F.2d at 1557.

"See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.

10 See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
1o Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1557 (quoting 2 SENATE COMM. ON ENVIRONMENTAL
AND PUBLIC WORKS, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 A Legislative History of the CERCLA 945

(Comm. Print 1983) (remarks of Rep. Harsha)).
112 "Owner or operator" is defined at 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A); see also supra notes
33-41 and accompanying text.
101The statutory exemption for those holding an indicia of ownership pnmarily to
protect a security interest is found at 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A); see also supra notes 3341 and accompanying text.
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the decision. In the Eleventh Circuit, liaple parties under CER-

CLA now include owners, operators, and lenders who neither
own nor operate, but whose financial involvement supports an
inference of putative hazardous waste control. Amazingly, this
new class created in Fleet Factors is actually more vulnerable to

compensation liability than the two classes actually envisioned by
the Act.
To pursue a person as the "owner" or "operator" of a
facility, the government or other party seeking compensation for
CERCLA costs must prove actual ownership or operation by that
person. Regarding ownership, CERCLA imposes liability regardless of any consideration of management participation.' 04Extrapolating from the exemption's language, a CERCLA owner is a
person who holds ownership indicia for a primary purpose other
than protection of a security interest. Thus a lender holding such
a non-exempt ownership interest would be liable as an owner,
irrespective of management participation.
Operator liability is more problematic. Again relying on the
exemption language, an operator is a person participating in the
management of a facility The imposition of operator liability has
uniformly turned on a high level of actual, operational participation in the affairs of a facility 105 Indeed, in United States v
-o Since liability can attach to either an owner or operator, it is obvious that a
person could own and thus be liable with absolutely no management participation. See
New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985) (CERCLA "imposes
strict liability on the
owner of a facility
without regard to causation.").
,01See Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 861 F.2d 155, 157-158
(7th Cir. 1988) (The court noted that the statute's circularity suggested that the "ordinary
meaning" of the term "operator" should control. Then it invoked common law doctrines
of independent contractor and joint venturer liability to set a high involvement and
control standard of operator liability.); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical &
Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 743 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1989) (The
court approved the imposition of liability on corporate officers, without disregarding the
corporate entity, arguing that CERCLA supports direct "operator" liability for "corporate officers and employees who are responsible for making corporate decisions about
the handling and disposal of hazardous substances.
" The implication is a need for
such involvement for the imposition of operator liability.); Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at
1052 (holding corporate officer "in charge of the operation of the facility in question"
liable as operator); United States v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 729 F Supp. 1461, 1468
(D. Del. 1990) ("Although interpreted broadly, the statute [CERCLA] requires that a
person be actively participating in the management of the facility to be held liable for
the disposal of hazardous wastes." The court conditioned operator liability on "an active
role in the operation of the
site" and "control of the hazardous substances being
processed."); United States v. Carolawn Co., 21 ERC 2124, 2131 (D.S.C. 1984) (imposing
operator liability based on an individual's "control or authority over the activities of a
facility from which hazardous substances are released.
").
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Kayser-Roth,'°6 a case cited in Fleet Factors for its enumeration
of operator liability critena, 0 7 the court stressed "practical total
control"10 and "pervasive control,"'' 9 as factors in determining
the existence of operator status. Rockwell Int'l Corp. v UI Int'l
Corp."0 further typifies the notion that high level operational
participation is the benchmark for operational classification:
Thus, "only those who actually operate or exercise control over
the facility that creates an environmental risk can be held liable"
Mere ability to exercise control as a result of the
financial relationship of the parties is insufficient for liability
to attach."'
The Eleventh Circuit's lender participation standard is conceptually incogitable. Lenders who would not be liable as owners
(since they hold ownership indicia primarily to protect a security
interest) and would not be liable as operators (since they do not
actively participate in the operational aspects of facility management) can be held liable under a hybrid liability test of putative
control based on inferences drawn exclusively from financial participation.
CONCLUSION

In its interpretation of CERCLA's secured creditor exemption
the Eleventh Circuit misperceived the issue before it. Its task was
to expound an exemption-a safe harbor included in CERCLA
for the express purpose of protecting lenders. Instead of defining
this CERCLA provision with an eye toward exemption, the court
expanded the liability of lenders beyond that imposed on owners
or operators-CERCLA's liability foci. This result will lead lenders to say "thanks but no thanks" to the exemption itself.
Although attempting to rely on normative justification in its
decision," 2 the Eleventh Circuit ignored the fairness inherent in

,06724 F Supp. 15 (D.R.I. 1989), aff'd, 910 F.2d 24 (Ist Cir. 1990).
101Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1557 n.10.
- United States v. Kayser-Roth, 724 F Supp. 15, 22 (D.R.I. 1989), aff'd, 910 F.2d
24 (Ist Cir. 1990).
109Id.
£,o 702 F Supp. 1384 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
" Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. UI Int'l Corp., 702 F Supp. 1384, 1390 (N.D. Ill. 1988)
(quoting Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Matenals Co., 685 F Supp. 651, 657
(N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1988)).
112See

supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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exempting lenders under CERCLA's scheme. Lenders who are not
also owners or operators simply do not have the proprietary stake
or practical control that warrants liability Congress recognized
this; the Eleventh Circuit did not.
The exemption inserted by Congress should be read as an
affirmation of CERCLA's basic liability structure. That is, the
exemption affirmatively states what should be otherwise apparent
under the Act. Lenders who own should be liable as owners;
lenders who operate should be liable as operators. But lenders
who neither own nor operate should be exempt. Congress used
the Act's exemption to underscore this normative judgment, a
judgment tacitly recognized, but overtly ascribed to, in United
States v Mirabile."3
CERCLA unequivocally espouses the pursuit of liable parties
as an end; the means to this end (the results of Congress's
evaluation of the relative culpabilities of involved parties) lie
within the Act. The judiciary's role should be limited to implementation of this statutory model. Thus:
To the point that courts could achieve "more" of the legislative
objectives by adding to the lists of those responsible, it is enough
to respond that statutes have not only ends but limits. Born of
compromise, laws such as CERCLA and SARA do not pursue
their ends to their logical limits. A court's job is to find and
enforce stopping points no less than to implement other legis11 4
lative choices.
The impact of the Eleventh Circuit's over-zealous CERCLA
interpretation may be great. Greater oversight from lenders involved in suspect areas will surely result. At a mimmum, lenders
will proceed into areas involving the presence of hazardous substances with heightened caution. Indeed, those lenders not yet
involved in potentially dangerous industries would be foolish not
to think twice about participating in such ventures. Indirectly,
manufacturers and other industrial parties will either face difficulty in acquiring financing, or will acquire financing on burdensome terms. Congress, as evidenced by its inclusion of CERCLA's
safe harbor for lenders, neither authorized nor envisioned such
results. The Eleventh Circuit, by polluting this safe harbor, un-

13

"

1988).

15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20994, 20995 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 861 F.2d 155, 157 (7th Cir.
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justifiably superseded a clear legislative judgment, leaving lenders
in an unwarrantedly precarious position.
Robert E. Wier

